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AbstractThis paper presents a classification of the monetary policy frameworks (MPFs) of 19 MENA countries from 1974 to 2017. It identifies the key trends in the region and contrasts them with the trends among three other groups: advanced countries, emerging countries and Latin American countries. It considers likely reasons for the MPF choices of MENA governments and notes the economic performance associated in the region and elsewhere with different MPFs. It examines how these MPF choices relate to trends in central bank independence and transparency, and in democracy and governance. Finally, it brings these elements together in an argument that a move to democracy in the MENA countries could open the way to monetary policy frameworks that would offer improved economic performance.

A statistical methodology is developed to identify when policymakers in 'advanced' economies have successfully pursued different single objectives or multiple objectives. Multiple objectives pure and simple are distinguished from multiple objectives subject to a price stability constraint. The overall and individual country results seem plausible. Unconditional and conditional analyses reveal that constrained multiple objectives are associated with roughly as good economic performance (inflation, economic growth) as the single objective of inflation. Finally the paper shows how the remit of an inflation‐targeting central bank could be adjusted to allow it to pursue other objectives in extremis without losing the credibility effects associated with inflation targeting.

• Resumen: Para los macroeconomistas de fuera del Reino Unido y para otros que no son economistas los cambios en los debates fundamentales sobre la teoría y la política macroeconómica desde finales de la última década en dicho país son mucho menos claros que para los macroeconomistas británicos, y son vistos por aquellos en términos de una distinción simple entre keynesianos y monetaristas. En este trabajo se argumenta que esta visión simplista del debate se ha convertido en falsa; se indican los cambios que se han presentado en la macroeconomía británica desde comienzos de la década de 1970 y se sugieren algunos de los factores que son responsables de estas transformaciones. Para demostrar este argumento se presenta una caracterización breve del keynesianismo y monetarismo británicos de finales de la década de 1960 y principios de la siguiente en términos de cinco puntos fundamentales; luego se explican las razones por las cuales se han dado importantes elementos de convergencia acerca de estos puntos entre las dos corrientes; posteriormente se discuten algunos de los desarrollos teóricos y de las experiencias de la política macroeconómica del Reino Unido que han contribuido a esta convergencia; y por último se anotan las divergencias entre las dos nuevas corrientes del pensamiento macroeconómico, a saber: la corriente convergente y la corriente de los "nuevos clásicos" . • Abstract: Much of the recent debate about macroeconomic theory and policy in the United Kingdom has been seen as a simple clash between monetarists and Keynesians. This article argues that the vision is false. It traces out the changes which have taken place in the British economy since the start of the seventies and suggest some of the possible causes. These are developed around a framework of five fundamental differences that existed between monetarists and Keynesians at the start of the seventies and explains why there has been significant convergence over the disputed issues. Finally it notes the development of new dualism in policy discussion between the convergent views discussed in the earlier sections and the position taken by the new classical economists.

Evidence is presented on the extent to which the possibility for the exchange rate to vary has been useful or unhelpful for UK monetary policy over the last two decades. 'Large' exchange rate changes and 'large' misalignments are identified, and the thinking and actions of the monetary authorities in response to the level of and changes in the exchange rate in successive monetary regimes are examined. It is argued that the exchange rate has not generally functioned as a useful automatic equilibrating mechanism or as a useful policy instrument; and that in nearly every phase there were movements of the exchange rate, or pressures on it, which for the authorities were unexpected and unwelcome. Thus the exchange rate has typically been a source of extraneous shocks.